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 The fundamental problem of biosafety arises from two circumstances: First, it is 
generally evident that the momentum of discovery in molecular biology in particular is 
simultaneously enabling therapeutic and destructive applications of extraordinary potential 
consequence. But, second, no one is able to judge with assurance the exact character or extent of 
those consequences. Speaking of the human species as a whole, we have collectively initiated the 
acquisition of knowledge whose ultimate consequences we cannot determine. We have therefore 
created problems of prudential management we are not as yet either conceptually or 
institutionally prepared to handle. I understand this forum to be a welcome and important 
instance of the presumably lengthy effort that will ultimately be required to respond to this 
situation.1
 
Admittedly technical capability, particularly destructive capability has often exceeded 
understanding over the course of history, and one can plausibly argue that situations of that sort 
are a recurring feature of the human condition. Nonetheless this situation does appear to be 
unprecedented both in character and in magnitude. For the first time in all of history, one species 
has identified the dynamics of basic life processes in sufficient detail to be able to intervene with 
some degree of deliberateness in the process of evolution itself. But that capacity is not and will 
not be accompanied by an ability to understand all the implications. It already seems evident that 
hundreds of millions of individual lives might in principle be enhanced, salvaged, degraded, 
manipulated or terminated depending on how advanced knowledge is applied. It is conceivable 
that the viability of the human species as a whole and of the global ecology on which it depends 
might be at stake. In the end that may not prove to be correct, but it is prudent to assume that it 
could be.  
 
If we admit that much, as I believe we are obliged to do, then we are also obliged to 
imagine a constructive response to the situation. And in doing so we are justified in assuming 
that the magnitude of potential consequence might eventually induce much more substantial 
innovation than we would be inclined to expect if current attitudes and institutional arrangements 
were the exclusive source of guidance. With those observations in mind, I want to outline the 
criteria required both to establish effective protection against the destructive potential of 
biotechnology and also to assure full development of its benefits with reasonably equitable 
access to those benefits. I believe those two purposes – effective protection and equitable access 
– ultimately depend on each other, despite the natural inclination to purse one at the expense of 
the other.     
                                                 
1 My comments are derived from a working paper, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype 
Protective Oversight System, prepared in collaboration with Nancy Gallagher, Elisa D. Harris and Stacy 
Okutani at the University of Maryland. See also John Steinbruner and Stacy Okutani, “The Protective 






The Basic Principle 
 
Since the potential for beneficial and destructive application of biotechnology cannot be 
categorically disentangled, organized protection depends on reinforcing a fundamental principle 
of behavior already widely supported: namely, that biotechnology should not be used to do 
deliberate harm under any circumstance for any reason. That prohibition would apply not only to 
lethal applications but also to non-lethal uses undertaken for coercive purposes. It would also 
apply to stealthy manipulation. Do no harm is the core principle of the Hippocratic Oath that has 
been recognized since ancient times.  It is also the core principle that underlies prohibition of the 
use of biological weapons promulgated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and of the possession of 
such weapons embodied in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.  Although neither of those 
agreements enjoys universal legal adherence, no country currently proclaims the right or the 
intention to deploy biological weapons.  Some have refused to renounce that right as long as 
nuclear weapons are deployed, but that is not the same as asserting it. The basic principle is 
already in practice a universal norm, and it could be substantially strengthened with a dedicated 




The principal method for assuring compliance with the basic principle is also well 
established. In virtually all areas of human activity where misapplication of significant capability 
is a serious concern, requirements for independent oversight are imposed. Banks are audited so 
that they do not divert the money they are entrusted to manage. As best we can judge, no single 
individual anywhere in the world is ever allowed exclusive control over a nuclear weapon. The 
leading scientific journals do not publish research results without independent review of their 
credibility. The degree of vigor with which independent review is exercised is generally related 
to the degree of concern over misapplication, and that concern, of course, reflects judgments 
both of probability and of the magnitude of consequence. In some areas of biological research 
the magnitude of potentially destructive consequence is truly enormous, unprecedentedly so in 
fact, and the probability of occurrence, however it might be discounted, cannot be determined to 
be negligible. That almost certainly means that very vigorous oversight procedures will have to 
be applied to those areas of research.  
 
Since independent oversight is never intrinsically welcome and can itself have perverse 
consequences, there is and will continue to be strong resistance to applying it to areas of 
fundamental scientific inquiry where individual autonomy has been highly valued for the best of 
reasons. Scientists are accustomed to review of scientific merit before they publish their results. 
They are not accustomed to review of potential social consequence before they initiate the work 
expected to yield results of scientific merit. Although there are precedents and procedures that 
can be applied and limited initiatives that can be seen as precursors, there is as yet no review 
process anywhere in the world comprehensively and systematically assessing inherent social 
danger with a degree of vigor commensurate with the apparent problem. Eventually, however, 
despite predictable reluctance, a process that is commensurate with the underlying problem will 
certainly have to be considered and probably attempted.      
 
If it is to be adequately effective, an independent review process addressing potential 
social consequence in advance of scientific experimentation would have to operate on a global 
scale. The remarkable momentum of discovery in molecular biology is the result of widely 
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dispersed research in the biomedical community, virtually all of it undertaken for compellingly 
legitimate reasons. The dynamics of infectious disease that pose the primary source of threat are 
inherently global in character, as has long been recognized. Under these circumstances no 
oversight process confined to national jurisdiction can aspire to offer adequate protection. 
Moreover, an adequately effective oversight process would also have to be actively practiced and 
comprehensively applied in the sense that all relevant areas of research would have to be 
subjected to the same procedures utilizing consistent criteria of judgment. That almost certainly 
means that the process would have to be legally mandatory. Voluntary arrangements do not 
command the commitments of time or the allocation of resources necessary to assure effective 
performance. Nor by definition do they have the authority necessary to assure compliance.  
 
An oversight process meeting these standards would subject relevant areas of biological 
research to a degree of independent scrutiny calibrated to the degree of social danger posed. That 
would require robust and widely accepted determinations of what research is relevant and how 
degree of danger should be assessed. Achieving effective global consensus on those 
determinations and their operational implications would undoubtedly be a very demanding 
venture, but one can nonetheless plausibly imagine how it might work out. The most extreme 
category of danger, for example, would be reserved for those research activities that might reveal 
in specific detail how pathogens more lethal or otherwise more objectionably consequential than 
those that have naturally evolved might be created. All projects of that sort would have to be 
reviewed in advance at an international level of jurisdiction by people competent to judge both 
the science involved and the potential social consequence of its application.  If approved, 
implementation of those projects would be monitored, and knowledge of their results would be 
restricted to globally authorized individuals with legitimate reasons for having that knowledge.  
 
Under such an arrangement, most research with the more dangerous of the currently 
known pathogens would be assigned to a second tier category of danger, and active oversight 
would continue to be handled through national jurisdiction. Active international efforts would be 
undertaken, however, to upgrade national oversight arrangements according to agreed standards 
and to harmonize the judgments made within separate national jurisdictions. A third tier category 
would be defined for research activities that are of less immediate concern but might nonetheless 
create more dangerous pathogens through the application of advanced research techniques. 
Projects in that category would be subjected to local oversight entities whose review process 
would be regulated and harmonized by the relevant national review bodies. Most biological 
research activities would fall outside these categories and would not be subjected to this form of 
independent review, but efforts would be made to assure general knowledge of the requirements 
and submission to those requirements at any point when research results appear to require it.  
 
Establishing review procedures of this sort would not provide absolute protection against 
the deliberately or inadvertently destructive application of biotechnology. It would provide a 
much more advanced standard of protection than currently exists, however, and would be a 




Any serious effort to develop a global oversight process would undoubtedly require 
considerable conceptual, legal, institutional and political innovation and would involve very 
substantial adjustment of prevailing public health and national security practices. I will not 
attempt to assess all that might be entailed, but I would like to emphasize the importance both of 
devising a viable definition of technical danger and of making a prudent judgment about its 
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immediate operational character. A credible definition is essential to designing a globally 
acceptable oversight arrangement. An accurate judgment of immediate threat is critical to the 
design as well but also to any hope of initiating productive official discussions of the topic.  
 
There are two functional purposes that a definition of technical danger must achieve. It 
must determine in a generally understood and accepted manner what persons and what projects 
are to be subjected to what level of oversight. It also must provide a coherent basis for exercising 
independent judgment in the course of oversight. Those purposes are sufficiently different to 
affect the nature of the definition advanced. A procedural definition is appropriate for 
determining oversight jurisdiction. A substantive definition is necessary for making oversight 
judgments.  
 
In implementing this distinction, the first tier categorization of danger requiring 
international oversight jurisdiction might be applied to any proposed research with any of the 
following characteristics:  
• Any work on the variola virus (smallpox) or a comparably virulent agent that has 
been eradicated in nature, 
• Any spontaneously infectious agent requiring BSL 4 level of containment, 
• Synthesis of any agent matching the above characteristics, 
• Expanding the host range or tissue range of any agent that would otherwise be 
assigned to a lower tier category, 
• Constructing vaccine resistant or antibiotic resistant strains of agents that would 
otherwise be assigned to lower tier categories.  
In effect those provisions would formalize and generalize current arrangements for international 
scrutiny of smallpox research.  
 
With jurisdiction so determined, guidelines for the exercise of international oversight 
would be based on the intrinsic properties of the pathogens proposed to be either the subject or 
the product of the research submitted for review; notably, their transmissibility, infectivity and 
pathogenicity. Transmissibility refers to the ability of a pathogen to propagate spontaneously 
from one host to another; infectivity to its ability to penetrate a new host and reproduce within it; 
and pathogenicity to the incidence and severity of the diseases it causes. Of these transmissibility 
is of particular concern from the perspective of social impact. The ability to threaten large 
numbers of people, plants or animals in a short period of time essentially depends on a highly 
transmissible pathogen. Unfortunately the determinants of transmissibility are not well 
understood or well measured, but that means there is reason to be especially careful.  
 
The operational judgment of immediate danger has to do with assessing the most likely 
source of destructive application. Deliberate terrorism is clearly the most frequently mentioned 
candidate, but it is not, I would argue, the most imminent threat. The greater problem arises from 
national government programs conducting threat assessment activities that are protected from 
international scrutiny by national security classification. There has been a surge of such activity in 
the United States in reaction to the malicious use of anthrax in 2001, but other governments are 
undertaking apparently similar efforts.  That process generates reverberating suspicion and creates 
conditions under which competitive national government programs might create the threats they 
imagine they are attempting to defeat. The best protection against that danger is to conduct all 
threat assessment research under public health jurisdiction and rules of transparency. That would 
be my most urgent immediate recommendation.   
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